Introduction
When did Latin America fall behind, and has the gap between the developed countries and Latin America widened over time are recurrent questions among economic historians. The idea of long-run relative decline since independence has been favored in the literature (BulmerThomas 1994, 410) , while it is widely accepted that the origins of modern Latin American economic retardation are located in the nineteenth century (Coatsworth 1993; Haber 1997) . Coatsworth (1998) emphasizes that Latin America fell behind between 1700 and 1900, while the gap with the United States remained unchanged during the twentieth century. The evidence on comparative real product per head, assembled by Pablo Astorga and Valpy Fitzgerald (1998, 353) , lends support to this view. 1 Explanatory hypotheses for the early failure of Latin America emphasize the initial colonial conditions. The radically different evolution of Anglo and Latin Americas reflects the imposition of distinct metropolitan institutions on each colony (North 1990) . Initial inequality of wealth, human capital, and political power conditioned institutional design and, thus,
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poor performance in Latin America relative to the United States (Engerman and Sokoloff 1997) . Latin America's fate could thus be explained with Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson's (2002) "reversal of fortune" theory: in areas of relative affluence, with abundant population, such as MesoAmerica and the Andes, Europeans established "extractive institutions," with political power concentrated in the hands of an elite, as the most efficient choice-in spite of its long-term negative effects on growth. While in poor, less densely populated areas, Europeans settled in large numbers and developed their own institutions that encouraged investment and growth.
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Another view stresses the role of colonial independence in modern Latin America's destiny. The break with colonial rule destroyed institutions that provided credible commitments to rights and property within the Spanish empire and, as a result, widespread turmoil, violence, and political instability took place after independence, with the consequence of sluggish economic growth (North, Summerhill, and Weingast 2000) . Views from the Dependencia school concur. The failure to achieve sustained and balanced growth in the new republics over the nineteenth century resulted from the persistence of colonial heritage (Frank 1967; Stanley and Barbara Stein 1970) . Dependentists saw the opening to the international economy as a cause of increasing inequality across and within countries, stressing the role of the terms of trade in Latin American retardation by shifting resources to primary production (Singer 1950) and by provoking immiserizing growth (Prebisch 1950) .
Interpretations of Latin America's early backwardness rest on a longrun comparison with the United States. It must be pointed out, however, that most countries, including those of Western Europe, fell behind over the nineteenth century when measured by American standards (Maddison 2003; Prados de la Escosura 2000) . Moreover, the claim that Latin America's relative position to the United States remained mostly unaltered during the twentieth century, as proof that her economic retardation occurred in the nineteenth century (Astorga and Fitzgerald 1998; Coatsworth 1998) is at odds with the post-1950 catching-up experience in large areas of the periphery (southern Europe, southeast Asia), in which the gap with the United States in income per head was significantly reduced. The United States appears, therefore, a questionable yardstick to assess Latin America's economic performance.
early nineteenth century has important consequences for the ongoing debate on its causes. If her backwardness originated in the decades after independence, institutional and factor endowments differences with the United States and western Europe are relevant to provide an explanation. If, however, her retardation occurred in the late twentieth century, discrepancies between Latin and British Americas during the colonial and the postindependence periods become secondary to exploring what went wrong in Latin America during the phase of widespread catching up to the developed countries in regions of the periphery (southern Europe, East Asia). Explanations that emphasize the cost of inward-looking policies, macroeconomic instability, and poor contract enforcement would then come to the fore. 4 My purpose in this paper is to reexamine the timing of Latin America's economic retardation-first, by using a more representative comparator, such as a group of countries included under the OECD acronym, and second, by resorting to the tools employed in the inequality literature. 5 Interestingly, in their pioneering contribution, Bourguignon and Morrisson (2002, 738) did not discuss the case of Latin America, "because its economic growth over the last two centuries has roughly coincided with the world average." 6 Among the main findings of the paper that can be highlighted are that, contrary to widespread belief, it was during the late twentieth century when Latin America fell behind more dramatically. A long-term rise in real average per capita income inequality is found for a large sample of countries encompassing most of Europe, the Americas, and Oceania. The rise in intercountry inequality resulted from the widening gap between the OECD countries and Latin America, as opposed to the reduction in income differences within each of these country groups. As a result, polarization emerged.
This chapter is organized as follows: section 1.2 compares per capita income levels and growth rates. Section 1.3 presents new measures of longrun intercountry economic inequality that can be decomposed into the underlying changes within and across regions' inequality. When did Latin America fall behind is re-assessed in the concluding section.
Real Income Trends
In international comparisons, dissatisfaction with nominal income (that is, GDP per head in national currency converted into a common currency, When Did Latin America Fall Behind? 17 using the trading exchange rate) has led to an almost generalized use of real income (the conversion of per capita income into a common currency is carried out with a purchasing power parity [PPP] exchange rate). 7 Unfortunately, the construction of PPP converters involves high costs in terms of time and resources. Only PPPs for a restricted country sample that does not include any of Latin America have been constructed for earlier periods, and most of them for output components. 8 An indirect method to derive historical estimates of real income levels for a large sample of countries is the backward projection of PPP-adjusted GDP per capita for a recent benchmark with volume indices (or growth rates) of product per head derived from national accounts data.
9 It is worth noting that fixed-base real (PPP-adjusted) product data represent a most convenient alternative to carrying out painstaking direct comparisons across space and time, and have the presentation advantage that their growth rates are identical to those calculated from national accounts.
10
Alas, a distant PPP benchmark introduces distortions in intertemporal comparisons, since its validity depends on how stable the basket of goods and services used to construct the original PPP converters remains over time. As growth occurs over time the composition of output, consumption, and relative prices all vary, and the economic meaning of comparing real product per head based upon remote PPPs becomes entirely questionable. Hence, using a single PPP benchmark for long-run comparisons implies the hardly realistic assumption that no changes in relative prices (and hence, no technological change) takes place over time.
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Leandro Prados de la Escosura 7. Empirical evidence gathered in recent years strongly rejects the conventional results obtained through the trading exchange rate converter (Summers and Heston 1991, van Ark 1993) . Trading exchange rates only reflect the purchasing power of goods traded internationally, and are influenced by capital movements, exchange controls, and speculation (Maddison 1995, 162) . In other words, foreign exchange rates do not measure relative price levels and do not move with them over time (Ahmad 1998). 8. In addition to O'Brien and Keyder's (1978) and Fremdling's (1991) PPP computations for commodity output, there are sectoral PPP estimates: for agriculture, Luiten van Zanden (1991) and O'Brien and Prados de la Escosura (1992), and for manufacturing, Broadberry and Fremdling (1990) , Broadberry (1994 Broadberry ( , 1997 , Burger (1997) , and Dormois and Bardini (1995) . Exceptionally, Williamson (1995) used an income approach. Recently, Ward and Devereux (2003a, 2003b) have accepted the challenge to build direct PPP estimates from the expenditure side for twelve western economies at five benchmarks (1872, 1884, 1905, 1930, and 1950) .
9. Maddison's (2003) 1990 Geary-Khamis dollar estimates provide the best example. 10. A significant strand of the literature defends the view that the best estimates of growth rates are those obtained from national accounts (Bhagwati and Hansen 1973; Isenman 1980; Kravis and Lipsey 1991; Maddison 1991 Maddison , 1995 on the grounds that "using domestic prices to measure growth rates is more reliable, because those prices characterize the trade offs faced by the decision making agents" (Nuxoll 1994 (Nuxoll , 1423 . Kravis and Lipsey (1991, 458) argued that growth rates derived from domestic prices were preferable because the basket of goods used "reflected the preferences of purchasers of final product in one of the years being compared."
Since PPP exchange rates were not computed directly for Latin American countries in 1990 (Maddison 1995 (Maddison , 2001 , I have resorted to a set of own-country weights (Paasche) PPP direct computations by the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) for 1960, never used before in historical studies, which provides a wider spatial coverage. The commodity basket included 261 consumption goods and 113 investment goods for capital cities in nineteen Latin American countries and the United States (Houston and Los Angeles). Prices were collected in 1960-62. Quantity expenditure weights for a Latin American average and the United States in 1960 were used (ECLA 1968; Stanley Braithwaite 1968 1970 and 1975 (Salazar-Carrillo 1983 Salazar-Carrillo and Tirado de Alonso 1988; Salazar-Carrillo and Prasada Rao 1988) .
12. I have replicated the whole exercise presented here at 1980 international prices with no major discrepancies in the results, except for the fact that relative levels of Latin America's per capita GDP in terms of OECD average are significantly higher when expressed in 1980 international dollars.
13. It is worth noting that the 1970 benchmark, originally published by CEPAL (the Spanish acronym of ECLA; 1978) and used in Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald (2005) , is just a projection of the 1960 benchmark levels with each Latin American country's inflation differential to the United States.
14. I am currently preparing new shortcut current price estimates of real income (at U.S. relative prices) for Latin America.
15. The sources for the volume indices of GDP per head are provided in appendix A.
erage in table 1.1 (columns in bold) should be preferred. 16 Some main features of historical performance in Latin America can be pointed out. In the first place, the origins of modern economic growth, as defined by a sustained increase in output per person, can be traced back at least to the midnineteenth century. Latin America appears to have experienced a sustained and gradual growth over one and a half century, a trend only broken during the 1890s, the Great Depression, and, especially, the 1980s crisis, in which per capita GDP multiplied by 8.5 times.
Alas, only scant quantitative evidence exists for the early nineteenth century. Growth rates varied substantially across Latin America. Mexico seems to have experienced a decline in per capita income during the period of independence and a very mild recovery between the 1820s and midnineteenth century (Coatsworth 1989 (Coatsworth , 2003 Salvucci 1997) , and the fate of Peru was probably similar (Quiroz 1993) , while Brazil appears to have experienced stagnation (Leff 1982) and, perhaps, also Colombia (Kalmanovitz 2005; Jaramillo Uribe, Meisel, and Urrutia 2001) . A longrun improvement in income per head occurred in Cuba until 1860 (Fraile, Salvucci, and Salvucci 1993; Santamaría 2005) , Venezuela (Baptista 1997 ), Chile , and it can be guessed, also in the River Plate (Newland 1998; Newland and Poulson 1998) . 17 On the whole, and if the fragmented evidence and conjectures for each country are weighted by its population, it can be hypothesized that, once independence was completed, moderate per capita income growth (below 0.5 percent per year) took place between the 1820s and mid-nineteenth century. If we accept these conjectures, it could be hypothesized that real per capita income multiplied by 10 between 1820 and 2000.
In table 1.2 growth rates are presented for different aggregates of Latin American countries; fortunately, the picture they offer of Latin America's long-run performance appears quite robust. After a slow start, Latin America grew significantly during the three decades following 1860 and, after the 1890s slowdown, growth accelerated in the early years of the twentieth century up to World War I. A comparison with the advanced countries shows that Latin America experienced faster growth than the OECD group in the 1880s and from 1900 to 1913. Latin America's output per head slowed down during World War I and reached a halt in the years of the Great Depression, but its comparative performance was not dissimilar from that of OECD countries during the interwar years. After the Depression, Latin America enjoyed its fastest phase of growth, which lasted more than four decades . Its rate of growth remained, however, below that of OECD countries, and only exhibited a better performance in the 1970s. As for the "Golden Age" , Latin America only managed to match the U.S. growth rate, but was way behind that of the OECD group. The 1980s represented a major break in the long-run performance of Latin America that the sluggish growth of the 1990s failed to offset. On the whole, the last two decades of the twentieth century offer the poorest relative economic record in the last one hundred and fifty years of Latin American history.
To sum up, during the decades after independence Latin America experienced moderate economic growth that fell short of that achieved by a small group of rich countries. Latin America then kept pace with the growth of the advanced countries' club throughout the period 1860-1938. The second half of the twentieth century represents, in turn, a phase of relative decline that was exacerbated in its last twenty years. In an
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Leandro Prados de la Escosura 17. For Venezuela, Baptista (1997) estimates indicate an annual compound rate of 2.2 percent for real income per head between 1831-35 and 1851-55. As for Cuba, figures suggested by Fraile, Linda and Richard Salvucci (1993) , and Santamaría (2005) allow us to suggest that per capita GDP grew at 0.6 percent per year between 1830 and 1850. In the case of Chile, Díaz, Lüders, and Wagner (1998) figures suggest that real output per head grew at 1.4 percent between 1820 and 1850. In turn, Argentina's littoral agricultural output per head grew at 2 percent per year over 1825-1865 (Newland and Poulson 1998; Newland 1998) . Assuming that this sector was representative of the littoral economy as a whole, and that no per capita growth occurred in Argentina's interior provinces, an overall rate of growth of 0.8 percent would result for per capita GDP. It could reasonably be assumed that Uruguay evolved as did Argentina. As regards Mexico, a mild rise in GDP per capita at 0.2 percent per year over the period 1820-45 is suggested by Coatsworth (2003) . increasingly globalized world, in which access to the latest technological vintage depends upon a country's social capability, Latin American performance appears especially disappointing. The cases of southern Europe and, more recently, of southeast Asian nations provide a most interesting counterpoint. Starting from lower levels of GDP per head and, subsequently, with a poorer endowment of human and physical capital, a faster growth rate could, ceteris paribus, have been expected. However, only in the 1880s, 1900-13, and in the 1970s, did Latin America grow above the OECD average (and the United States).
Decomposing per capita GDP growth using identity (I) provides a more accurate description of Latin American slowdown in the late twentieth century. If low case represents annual rates of variation, per capita income growth can be broke down into the addition of the rates of variation of output per economically active population (EAP), of the activity rate (the EAP ratio to population ages 15 to 64, or potentially active population [PAP] ), and of the share of PAP in total population.
(1) y pc ϭ ϩ ϩ
In the 1950s and 1960s, labor productivity overcame per capita GDP growth, making for a declining activity rate and a higher dependency rate (the ratio of population below 15 and above 65 to PAP; table 1.3). Since the 1970s, however, labor productivity lagged behind GDP per head growth but was offset by the rise in the activity rate and by the demographic gift of an increasing share of potentially active population, that, from 1980 onward, constituted the only basis for rising per capita income. The increase in the activity rate was related to the reduction of unemployment and, especially during the nineties, to the incorporation of women into the labor force (Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald 2003, 35) .
A further decomposition of labor productivity into physical and human capital per worker and total factor productivity (TFP) is necessary to un-
Leandro Prados de la Escosura derstand the slowing down in workers' efficiency. For the 1980-2000 period, Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald (2003, 34) suggest an average decline in TFP growth together with a deepening fall in capital. A more benign view of TFP growth is offered by André Hofman (2001) , who points out that the decline in labor productivity reflects a "strong increase" in labor inputs.
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So far, the focus of attention has been on Latin America as a whole (figure 1.2), but the region comprises a heterogeneous group of countries that exhibit substantial discrepancies in their factor endowments and long-run performance. The fact that most economic historians only focus their research on a country or just one of its regions supports the case. Latin America as a whole is, however, what scholars see from the outside and, therefore, remains a valid concept once allowance is made for the wide dispersion in terms of performance and policies.
Growth rates in per capita GDP for major Latin American countries at roughly decadal benchmarks are presented since 1850 in table 1.4. The high variance of growth rates across countries and across different periods is worth highlighting. Argentina, Chile, and Mexico's income per head grew above Latin America's average between 1870 and 1913 , while Brazil, Colombia, Peru, and Venezuela achieved it during 1913 . On the whole, When Did Latin America Fall Behind? 25
18. Also, Fajnzylber and Lederman (2000) and Hofman (2000) found a negative TFP growth in the 1980s. during the early phase of modern economic growth Colombia, Peru, Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, Argentina grew above the region's average. In the second phase of sustained expansion , Mexico and especially Brazil emerge above the average, while Chile stands alone as the best performer in the last two decades of the twentieth century. As countries starting from lower income levels (Colombia, Peru, Venezuela) have grown faster than average, while richer countries (Uruguay, Argentina) have grown at a slower pace over the long run, a pattern of convergence among Latin American nations has been building up over time (see figure 1.3). It is worth noticing that the southern cone countries, and Argentina, in particular, conditioned divergence and convergence trends within the region. In the pre-World War I era Argentina's economic success determined per capita income divergence across countries. Conversely, Argentina's slowing down from 1914 onward is behind the process of convergence observed during the twentieth century.
The comparison with other regions or countries allows us to place Latin America's achievements into an international perspective. But, which is the adequate yardstick to assess Latin America's success or failure? Usually Latin America is examined in the U.S. mirror, and widespread interpretations of early failure and moderate success in the twentieth century are derived that way. However, even western European economies fell behind relative to the United States over the nineteenth century (Prados de la Escosura 2000). Moreover, the fact that Latin America's relative position And what can be conjectured about Latin America's relative position in the early nineteenth century? The outcome is highly sensitive to the inclusion of Coatsworth's (1989 Coatsworth's ( , 2003 higher dependency rates, and from a lower activity rate (a feature related to a lower female participation in the labor force). The persistence of high dependency rates in Latin America (table 1.8) hints at the lack of incentives to reduce fertility and to the weak demand of human capital that helped to bring about the demographic transition in OECD countries (Galor 2004) . In sum, modern Latin America experienced sustained growth since the second quarter of the nineteenth century-only brought to a halt during the 1890s, the Great Depression, and, overall, the 1980s. Growth was accompanied by relative backwardness, in particular during the second half of the twentieth century, and especially since 1980. It is true that Latin America fell behind in the early years of independence if she is compared to the core's richest countries, but in order to understand Latin America's long-run economic retardation, the late twentieth century appears a more suitable period to be explored than early independence years.
Long-Run Intercountry Inequality
A more rigorous assessment of intercountry average income inequality for the large country sample considered, which encompasses most of Eu-
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Leandro Prados de la Escosura Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) , for the world, was there a sustained rise in inequality up to 1950 that tended to stabilize thereafter? Did the widening gap between OECD countries (the core) and Latin America (the periphery) discussed in the previous section contribute to the rise in long-term inequality? All are pressing questions that deserve a response. All measures of inequality between OECD and Latin American countries are simultaneously provided for alternative sets of countries that allows us to test the sensitivity of the results to changes in their national composition. 20 Only countries for which data on GDP actually exists are in the sample. Needless to say, the quality and coverage of the estimates show a large variance, and usually fall as one goes back in time. The detailed results for the alternative country samples of OECD and Latin American countries are presented in the appendix (tables 1A.1-1A.4). In addition to inequality levels, yearly rates of inequality reduction-in other words, the speed at which inequality falls (positive sign) or rises (negative sign)-are shown at the bottom of each table.
A rise in per capita income inequality over the long run is observed for all the alternative Latin America and OECD countries sets (at an annual rate of around 1 percent over . It can be noticed that when measured with the MLD index, which gives more weight to changes at the bottom of the distribution, a larger inequality increase and level is obtained.
When Did Latin America Fall Behind? 33 20. The more comprehensive country the sample, the shorter its time span. The countries included in each group for real income inequality estimates are listed at the bottom of tables 1A.1-1A.4.
21. But neither heroic assumptions are introduced in an attempt to widen the geographical coverage of the sample, nor imaginative solutions for missing countries, such as assuming identical levels of income or growth rates as their neighbors, are employed.
22. Mean Logarithmic Deviation (MLD) is also known as Bourguignon's L, Theil's population-weighted index, and GE(0). Theil is short for Theil's income weighted index of inequality, also known as GE(1). Moreover, the more comprehensive the country coverage, the deeper the inequality ( figure 1.4) . 23 Two breaks in 1938 and 1980 allow us to identify three distinctive phases in the evolution of intercountry inequality. After a rapid increase in in-equality during 1850-70, it rose at a steady pace up to 1938, in which episodes of shrinking inequality took place in the 1880s and the 1930s. The disruption brought about by World War II provoked a dramatic upsurge in inequality, and although it fell during the following three decades, its level remained high. A major rise occurred again with the 1980s debt crisis in Latin America, which reached up to the end of the twentieth century. Inequality shifted upward during 1938-50 and in the 1980s at yearly rates of 4.8 and 3.2 percent, reaching levels of 0.24 and 0.36 for MLD in 1950 and 1990, respectively. It is worth recalling that it is in these two periods when the gap in per capita income widened between Latin America and the OECD group.
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The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed population and GDP growth that proceeded with different intensity across different countries. To what extent did the variance in their rates of growth have an impact on income inequality? I have simulated the yearly rates at which, other things being equal, inequality would have fallen if all countries in the sample had enjoyed identical population (or per capita income) growth. The actual way of carrying out the simulation was to compute weighted inequality measures in which, ceteris paribus, population (or per capita income) remained unchanged over each epoch. This amounts to allocating identical growth rates to population (or per capita income) for all countries in the sample. The simulation exercise has been carried out for each of the three epochs established in the evolution of inequality: 1870-1938, 1938-80, and 1980-2000 .  Table 1 .9 offers the results of simulating what would have happened in our country sample had the variance of population (or income) growth been zero. Without a significant variance in population and per capita income growth, the rise in inequality would have been larger over 1870 -1938 . During 1938 , the variance in per capita GDP growth prevented a larger rise in inequality, while the population growth variance contributed to increasing it. Both population and per capita income growth differentials had a part in inequality shifting upward during the last two decades of the twentieth century.
A glance at the simulations for OECD countries (table 1.10) shows that per capita income catching up was a main instrument in the decline in intercountry inequality, especially during the Golden Age. Prior to World War I, discrepancies in population growth mattered for the decline in inequality, suggesting that higher fertility and dependency rates in the New World might have contributed to checking inequality during the first phase of globalization.
When we focus on simulations for Latin America (table 1.11) it emerges that, over 1870-1913, differences in the pace of per capita GDP growth across the region contributed to rising inequality, associated to the economic progress in the areas of new settlement (Argentina and Uruguay), while discrepancies in population growth (in which immigration mattered) prevented a larger increase. During most of the twentieth century (1913-80) differences in economic growth contributed to reducing inequality, as a local process of convergence among Latin American countries was taking place (as the southern cone and, especially, Argentina, was experiencing a relative decline). After 1980, discrepancies in growth contributed to an increase in inequality, as not all countries reacted similarly after the debt crisis.
In sum, differentials in population growth, mostly stemming from Latin America's late demographic transition, represented an obstacle to reducing inequality in the OECD and Latin America country sample over 1938-2000. Such a finding is in conflict with Bourguignon and Morrison's (2002) contention that population growth rates are not associated with significant changes in world income distribution. In turn, differences in economic growth rates within Latin America help explain local convergence over 1913-80.
Another way to look at inequality trends is to decompose OECD and Latin American weighted inequality into the share attributable to distribution changes within each region and the share that stems from differences among regions. I have followed Theil (1979 Theil ( , 1989 in decomposing aggregate inequality into within-regions and between-regions inequality. Within-regions inequality is obtained by adding up the results of weighting each region's inequality measure by its population share, in the case of MLD, and by its income share in the case of Theil. Between-regions inequality is, then, obtained as the difference between total (OECD and Latin America) inequality and the computed within-regions inequality.
In figure 1 .5 one can observe that in within-regions inequality a moderate rise occurred in MLD up to 1929, while a slight decline happened in the case of Theil, followed in both cases by the dramatic rise up to 1950 and a decline during the Golden Age that led to stability for the rest of the century (although a rise since 1990 is noticeable for MLD). Figure 1 .6 shows, in turn, that between-regions inequality-that is, between OECD countries and Latin America-is a smoothed replica of total inequality for both MLD and Theil. It appears, then, that the main element underlying the observed increase in overall inequality was the deepening gap between OECD countries and Latin America.
When inequality within each region is examined, OECD countries exhibit (figure 1.7) a sustained decline in inequality since 1870, only interrupted by the upsurge resulting from World War II and its aftermath, and shadows closely the trend in within-regions inequality. Actually, when viewed in the long run, the inequality decline during the Golden Age is to a large extent the recovery of the level achieved prior to World War II.
Two clear trends emerged in inequality within Latin America (figure 1.8): a steep rise prior to 1914, followed by a sustained decline thereafter that seems to reverse since 1990, with the final result of similar levels of in- equality levels to those prevailing by mid-nineteenth century. Inequality across Latin American countries increased during the first phase of globalization, as countries reacted very differently, depending on their exposure to international commodity and factor movements. Argentina's economic success determined per capita income divergence across countries. Deglobalization in the interwar years spawned a reduction in acrosscountry inequality. The long-run fall in twentieth century inequality, in spite of a new phase of globalization after 1950, is associated with a process of convergence within Latin America, as lower-income countries achieved faster growth than richer ones-among which Argentine's collapse had a major part. Argentina's slowing down from World War I onward contributed to the process of local convergence.
To sum up, the long-run increase in inequality is mainly due to the widening gap between average incomes between OECD countries and Latin America that peaked in the late twentieth century. It is then when Latin America appears to have fallen behind. A process of convergence within Latin America paralleled its divergence with respect to the advanced countries.
Concluding Remarks and Research Agenda
A long-term rise in real per capita income inequality for a partial sample of the world that includes Latin America and OECD countries is confirmed. The deepening gap and subsequent polarization between the OECD group and Latin America was the major factor behind the observed increase. National differences in population growth, largely a consequence of the late demographic transition in Latin America, held up a fall in inequality during the twentieth century. This finding contradicts the benign view of a rise in inequality up to the mid-twentieth century that stabilized thereafter, as proposed by Bourguignon and Morrison (2002) and Sala i Martín (2002) .
These results provide an answer to the question of when did Latin America fall behind. It is true that when compared to the select club of the core's richest countries that experienced sustained per capita income growth prior to 1850, Latin America fell behind in the early years of independence-as did most countries at the time. However, the empirical findings presented here seriously challenge conventional assessments that locate Latin American economic retardation in the early nineteenth century and link it to geography, initial inequality of wealth and power, colonial heritage, and post-independence political instability and turmoil. They all certainly hindered long-run growth and a counterfactual scenario with law and order, lower inequality, and British-like institutions would have cast a higher growth rate in Latin America. However, blaming Latin America's long-term backwardness on the post-colonial epoch seems far-fetched. Contrary to a widely held view, Latin America's retardation appears to be a late-twentieth century phenomenon that should be explored if we want to understand why Latin America remains a backward region in a global world.
Ascertaining why Latin America's retardation occurred in the late twentieth century provides a research agenda. Why, during the period of fastest growth in Latin America-1938-80-did Latin America fall behind OECD countries, unlike southwestern Europe and East Asia? Is it misleading, as claimed by Astorga, Bergés, and Fitzgerald (2003) , to associate import-industrialization strategies to faltering performance, as, when such policies were implemented, growth intensified and welfare improved? Were neoliberal policies the causes of post-1980 economic stagnation and relative decline? Or was it because of poor institutional quality and lack of government credibility? These are among the pressing questions that will require further research. 
